Concessive conditionals assert if $p$ then $q$ against the assumption that $p$ and $q$ are in some sense incompatible (Haspelmath & König 1995). In Cuzco Quechua and German, concessive conditionals are formed by adding an additive marker to the conditional antecedent, as shown in (1a,b).

(1) [Context: Yesterday, we decided to go walking today, provided it wasn't raining. This morning, it looks like it might rain, and I say:]

a. Cuzco Quechua (elicited)
   \[ \text{Para-sha-qti-n=pas ri-sunchis.} \]
   \[ \text{rain-PROG-NMLZ.DS-3=ADD go-1.INCL.FUT} \]
   'We will go even if it is raining.'

b. German: \text{Wir werden gehen auch wenn es regnet.}

c. Assertion: We will go if it is raining

d. Additive presupposition: We will go if it is not raining

e. Conditional perfection of (1d): We won't go if it is raining

Both =pas and auch are non-scalar additives; the standard scalar analysis of concessive conditionals with even is therefore not directly applicable. Instead I propose, following Pasch (1995), to derive the concessive implication via conditional perfection (Geis and Zwicky 1979) of the additive presupposition in (1d), which is obtained by substituting the conditional antecedent in (1a,b) with its negation, its only focus alternative. The assertion (1c) contradicts (1e), resulting in the concessive interpretation. (1e) exemplifies a new species of presuppositional implicature (Leahy 2016): it strengthens (1d), and does not rely on a comparison with what else could have been said. Since conditional perfection only applies under the presumption of exhaustivity (de Cornulier 1983), concessive interpretations should not be available in non-exhaustive contexts. This will be shown to be the case for auch wenn.


\[ ^{1} \text{1, 3: person, ADD: additive, INCL: inclusive, NMLZ.DS: nominalizer different subject, PROG: progressive.} \]