The additivity of concessive *still*

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English concessive constructions with *although* and *but* convey the truth of both propositions as well as the fact that the combination of the two propositions is odd or unexpected. Little attention has been given to availability of concessive *still* in the consequent, especially to cases in which *although* and concessive *still* are not both available (1b); current accounts do not invoke the additive presupposition and assume an identical distribution of both operators.

(1) a. Although Ana had a sore throat, she (√still) went to work.
      b. *Ana grabbed the wrong bottle of pills.* Although Ana had a sore throat, she (#still) took the headache medicine.

I propose to account for the contrast in (1) by an additive presupposition: *if not p, then q*. Such a presupposition is counterfactual by nature, as the constructions involved convey *p*; the conditional may need to access worlds in a previous context set in which *p* was not settled, perhaps sharing theoretical similarity with aspectual *still* in which its additivity is restricted to a previous point in time. Applied to (1a), this would result in "if Ana didn't have a sore throat, she would go to work", a reasonable presupposition that is met. The infelicity of (1b) is explained as follows: if Ana didn't have a sore throat, it's not the case that she would have taken the headache medicine, since in such cases Ana may be perfectly healthy. This contradicts the additive presupposition as described, resulting in infelicity.

This proposal generates several classes of predictions on the distribution of concessive *still* within concessive constructions, including classes of examples in which *not p* logically entails *q*, in which *q* entails *p*, and in which *p* entails *q*. For example, in cases in which *q* entails *p*, *not p* entails *not q* by contraposition, thus contradicting the counterfactual additive presupposition. In such cases, still is always infelicitous as predicted:

(2) Although Bob is a swimmer, he's (#still) a poor swimmer.

References: • Guerzoni, E. & D. Lim. 2007. *Even if*, factivity and focus. *Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 11*, 276–290. • Ippolito, M. 2007. On the meaning of some focus-sensitive particles. *Natural Language Semantics* 15(1). 1–34. • König, E. & P. Siemund. 2000. Causal and concessive clauses: Formal and semantic relations. In E. Couper-Kuhlen & B. Kortmann (eds.), *Cause – condition – concession – contrast. Cognitive and discourse perspectives*, 341–360. New York: Mouton de Gruyter. • Lund, G. 2017. Deriving *even though* from *even*. *Proceedings of ESSLI*.